In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a transfer Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a non-empty Nash stable is the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, stable networks immune to bilateral deviations must be complete M -partite networks, with partitions of different sizes. The empty network is the efficient network. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of the network structure in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw may lead to both higher and lower rent dissipation depending on the network structure. We also describe how small shocks propagate through a contest network. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the bilateral interaction with local negative externalities such that the actions of individuals are neither complements nor substitutes.
Introduction
A contest is a strategic interaction in which opposing parties make costly investments in order to increase their chances to gain control over scarce resources. Contests have been studied in many different settings, including political rent seeking (Hillman and Riley, 1989) , discretionary spending of top managers (Inderst et al., 2007) , competition for funding (Pfeffer and Moore, 1980) , sport (Szymanski, 2003) , litigation (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014) , and armed conflict (König et al., 2017) . Individuals often compete with several opponents simultaneously. In this case, the set of bilateral contest relations in a population can be described as a network of contests. Contest networks emerge in many situations. For instance, (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014) empirically studies the network of patent infringements and antitrust lawsuits among US pharmaceutical firms. (König et al., 2017) empirically demonstrates the importance of the network structure of conflicts among groups in the Second Congo War. One could expect that the structure of contest network has important implications in other settings, including distributional conflicts in a federation as in (Wärneryd, 1998) , lobbying for discretionary spending of top managers as in (Inderst et al., 2007) , and appropriation of property rights as in (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013) .
In this paper we propose a model in which players make costly investments to extract resources from other players in the society. It is a model of weighted network formation, in which players choose with whom to engage in a bilateral contest and how much to invest in each contest. Our starting point is the model of contest on a given network (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) , in which agents play a bilateral Tullock contest game with their neighbors in the network. The prize of a contest is a fixed transfer from the loser to the victor of the contest. Our first departure from (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) is in the definition of the bilateral contest game, where we use a different specification which, contrary to one used in Franke and Ozturk (2015) , allows ties. Furthermore, in this paper we propose a model in which the structure of the contest network is determined endogenously. In the model, each agent strategically decides on the costly investment in contests with every other potential opponent in the society. We say that a link between two players exists or that they are engaged in a contest when at least one of them invests a nonzero effort in fighting with the other. In this setting, our first task is to describe the efficient network architecture that maximizes the sum of benefits of all agents in the society. We proceed by providing a characterization of stable network structures under different notions of stability. Finally we provide several comparative static results which highlight the importance of the network structure when assessing how changes in parameters of the model affect individual and aggregate outcomes. In the next few paragraphs we discuss our main results.
Since the contest effort is costly and the prize is a transfer, every contest is wasteful. Therefore, the efficient network architecture is the empty network in which no player invests in fighting.
We start our analysis of stability by defining Nash stable networks. We show that the Nash stable network is, generically, the complete network in which players exert the same effort in all contests 1 . This is true even though every player would prefer not to be engaged in any of her contests. The reason is the coordination problem when players contemplate a link destruction. For any contest in the complete network, both players would be better off if they destroyed the link between them. However, if one player unilaterally deviates and chooses investment 0, the other player is strictly better off if she invests a non-zero effort in the contest between them. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations -and thus a strong pairwise stable network (Bloch and Dutta, 2009 ) generically does not exist.
2 This is because a player is always better off by unilaterally starting a contest, and for any two players in the Nash stable network a joint deviation in which they destroy the link between them is profitable.
Starting a contest is always beneficial, since players do not take into account that the new opponent will fight back. The lack of forward looking is implied when using Nash equilibrium as a stability concept. We relax this assumption by allowing limited forward looking. We assume that a player, when forming a link, takes into account that the new opponent will fight back. However, we still assume that players do not take into account further adjustments in other players' strategies that may be a consequence of the new link creation. In that sense, players are limited farsighted. We define a limited farsighted pairwise stable network (LFPS) as a network which is immune to both unilateral and bilateral deviations of limited farsighted players.
The limited farsightedness assumption provides tractability, and we believe it is also sensible. Indeed, calculating the effect of a change in the network structure on the equilibrium investment profiles is a highly nonlinear problem even when the number of nodes in the network is small. Assuming that players are able to make these calculations would be a very strong assumption about their cognitive abilities. Moreover, recent experimental results suggest that, even in a simple bilateral Tullock contest game, players find it very difficult to anticipate strategies of their opponent. Furthermore, even when the action of the opponent is known, they fail to calculate the best response correctly (Masiliunas et al., 2014) . In (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) authors find evidence in favor of the limited farsightedness in an experimental investigation of much simpler network formation games.
We show that in every LFPS non-empty network, players are partitioned in M ≥ 2 partitions of unequal sizes. Members of the same partition do not have links with each other, but have links with all other players in the network. So, even though players are ex-ante homogeneous, a stable non-empty network is necessarily asymmetric. We now summarize the intuition behind this result. In the model, a strong player 3 has an incentive to form a link with a weak player, provided that the difference in their strengths is large enough. This is because it is cheaper to win a contest against a weak player than against a strong player. As the number of opponents of a weak player increases, she becomes relatively weaker and therefore a more attractive opponent for other strong players. This mechanism leads to network configurations involving three generic types of players in a stable network. The strongest players in the society (attackers) win in all of their contests. Hybrid type players are strong enough to win against the weakest players, but at the same time weak enough to be attractive opponents for the strongest players. Weak players are victims. They lose in all of their contests. There will always be a single class of attackers and a single class of victims in a stable non-empty network. Remaining M − 2 classes, if they exist, are classes of hybrids. There are no links between members of the same class in a LFPS network, whereas there is a link between any two players from different classes. The class of attackers is the largest class, while the class of victims is the smallest class.
Finally, we examine how the level of inefficiency in a stable network, as measured by the rent dissipation and the average contest intensity, depends on parameters of the model. We mention here a few interesting results. When the stable network is asymmetric enough, an increase in the likelihood of a draw (i.e. third party mediation intervention) may actually lead to an increase in the rent dissipation and the average contest intensity. On the other hand, when the network is not sufficiently asymmetric, an increase in the likelihood of a draw will always lead to a decrease in the rent dissipation and in the average contest intensity. We also describe how an idiosyncratic cost shock (i.e. a third party intervention affecting one player in the network) propagates through the network, and affects the investments of other players. The indirect effect of a small shock is proportional to a measure of centrality that we define.
Related work
Our paper contributes to the literature of weighted network formation in which players choose their investment levels specifically for each link. Several other papers study network formation with link-specific actions. (Goyal et al., 2008) studies the formation of R&D networks between firms that also compete in a market. (Bloch and Dutta, 2009 ) and the follow-up work by (Deroïan, 2009 ) study a model of network formation in which agents choose how much to invest in each of their communication links. (Baumann, 2017) develops a model of the friendship formation in which players choose how much time to devote in socializing with each of their friends, and how much time to spend alone. All of these papers consider a bilateral interaction which is directly beneficial to both parties (collaboration, communication, socializing) . Our model deals with a qualitatively different type of interactions -transferable contests. Moreover, in the above mentioned papers neighbors' actions are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In the model presented in this paper, neighbors' actions are neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements. This paper also contributes to the literature on contests. Studying contests has a long tradition in economics, starting from seminal works on rent seeking (Tullock, 1967) , and lobbying (Krueger, 1974) . A recent comprehensive review of the literature on contests can be found in (Corchón and Serena, 2018) . This literature is mostly concerned with the analysis of n-lateral contest games. In this paper, we consider an environment in which a population of players play interrelated bilateral contests. We model the bilateral contest game following (Nti, 1997 , Amegashie, 2006 and (Blavatskyy, 2010) . Since, in our model, the transfer size does not depend on the number of opponents (same as in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) ), our model captures the situations in which the prize is relational. For instance, this is may be the case in lobbying (Hillman and Riley, 1989) , appropriation of property rights (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013) , and litigation (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014) .
The importance of the structure of a contest network has recently been acknowledged in the literature, both theoretically and empirically. There are several papers that study contests on a given network. (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) develops a model of the contest on a given network in which players play bilateral contests with their neighbors. (Dziubiński et al., 2016) studies a model in which a network of connections between players determines potential conflicts, and agents sequentially choose if they wish to start a conflict with their neighbors and the effort level they are going to exert. (König et al., 2017 ) studies a conflict model on a given network where links can be of two types: enmity links or alliance links. All agents participate in a single n-lateral contest and the network structure is built into the payoff function. They also conduct an econometric analysis using data on the Second Congo War, and find that there are significant fighting externalities across contests. (Matros and Rietzke, 2018 ) studies a model of contest on a bipartite contest network in which nodes are contests and players. Players connected to the same contest play an n-lateral contest game. None of these models consider network formation. The model in this paper endogenizes the network structure in the model of (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) , and provides new comparative static results.
There are a few papers that consider formation of networks in which links indicate a presence of a contest. (Jackson and Nei, 2015) studies the impact of trade on the formation of interstate alliances and on the onset of war. They show that trade can mitigate conflict. (Grandjean et al., 2017) studies a network formation model in which agents form a network of collaboration links and then engage in a single nlateral contest. The position of a player in the collaboration network determines her valuation of the contest prize. The closest paper to ours is (Hiller, 2016) , which develops a model of network formation in which players form positive links (friendship) and negative links (enmity). A negative link indicates that players are involved in a contest. In (Hiller, 2016) players do not choose the fighting effort like they do in our model, and therefore the model in Hiller (2016) is not a model of weighted network formation. provides a comprehensive review of the literature on conflict and networks.
The rest of the paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 lays out the model. In Section 3 we characterize efficient and LFPS networks. In Section 4 we present comparative static results. Section 5 provides a characterization of Nash stable networks and strongly pairwise stable networks. We conclude in Section 6. All the proofs are given in Appendix A.
The Model
In this section we describe our network formation model. In the next paragraph we informally summarize the model. In Subsection 2.1 we formally introduce the notion of a contest network, and describe the model. In Subsection 2.2 we define the concepts of stability and efficiency we use in this paper.
Informally, we consider a population composed of a finite number of ex-ante identical players. Players can engage in bilateral contests. The outcome of a contest is probabilistic, and depends on costly investments by both parties. The prize of the contest is a fixed transfer from the loser to the winner. Individuals choose both with whom to engage in a contest and how much to invest in each contest. We are interested in stable and efficient social structures that arise from this type of interaction.
Setup
Denote with N the set of players, and with n the cardinality of set N . Let s i = (s ij ) j∈N \{i} ∈ R n−1 ≥0 denote the investment strategy of player i in bilateral contests with players j ∈ N \ {i}. Strategy profile s ∈ R (n−1)×(n−1) ≥0 defines directed weighted network Γ = Γ(s) with weights {s ij } i,j∈N associated to directed links {i → j} i,j∈N . Γ is the contest network. In writing, we omit the dependence on s when there is no danger of ambiguity.
The expected payoff of agent i from network Γ is defined by:
where s i = j∈N \{i} s ij is the total investment of player i in all of her contests. The function c : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is the cost function that we assume to be continuous, twice continuously differentiable with c(0) = 0, c (s) > 0 and c (s) > 0 for all s ∈ R ≥0 . The expected payoff of the bilateral contest between players i and j π ij (s ij , s ji ) is defined by:
The expression
1] is the probability with which i wins the transfer T = 1 from j, and defines the Contest Success Function (CSF) F : R 2 ≥0 → [0, 1]. The specific form of CSF we use in this paper is introduced in (Nti, 1997) . The technology function φ : R + 0 → R + 0 in (2) transforms investment in contest (i.e. money) into actual means of fighting (i.e. guns, lawyers). We assume that φ is: (i) continuous and twice differentiable, (ii) strictly increasing and weakly concave, and (iii) φ(0) = 0. The point (ii) imposes non-increasing returns to scale, and (iii) guarantees that zero investment implies zero actual means of fighting.
The parameter r ≥ 0 captures the likelihood of a draw (there is no transfer between players in the event of a draw). There are many situations in which contests can end without a winner. For instance, a litigation can end in a mistrial, sport contests often end with a tie, etc. Alternatively, one can interpret r as a noise in a transferable contest, using CSF proposed in (Blavatskyy, 2010) and modeling the noise as in (Amegashie, 2006) . In this paper we refer to r simply as the likelihood of a draw 4 . A comprehensive review of contest success functions that allow ties can be found in (Corchón and Serena, 2018) .
The CSF used in (2) is fairly general, and includes CSFs studied in (Tullock, 1980 , Loury, 1979 , Dixit, 1987 as special cases. In particular, by setting φ to be identity mapping and r = 0 we get the CSF used in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) .
We end this subsection by introducing some additional notation. We use g(s) to denote the non-weighted and undirected network induced by Γ(s). This means that g ij ∈ g(s) if s ij > 0∨s ji > 0. When strategy profile s results in a network g(s) we say that s supports g(s). We refer to g(s) as the network of interactions and use g ij to denote the contest between i and j. When starting from strategy profile s in which s ij = s ji = 0, player i deviates by choosing s ij > 0, we say that i started contest with j or that i formed link g ij . When we start from a strategy profile s in which s ij + s ji > 0, and move to a strategy profile with s ij + s ji = 0 we say that players i and j ended contest g ij or deleted link g ij . When there is no danger of ambiguity we omit the dependence on s in writing.
Efficiency and stability
In this subsection we first define efficient networks. Then we introduce the concepts of network stability we employ in this paper. We define Nash stable networks, and point out why using this standard equilibrium notion may be inadequate for the model we study. Finally, we introduce limited farsighted pairwise stability (LFPS), which circumvents the shortcomings of Nash stability and still allows for a reasonable tractability in the analysis. In Section 5 we discuss how LFPS relates to other stability concepts usually employed when stuyding the formation of weighted networks, namely Nash stability and the strong pairwise stability (Bloch and Dutta, 2009) . We also provide a characterization of Nash stable networks and strongly pairwise stable networks.
Define the value of network Γ with:
Following (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) we say that network Γ is efficient if it is maximizer of the value function V .
Definition 1
4 For other interpretations of r see (Nti, 1997) We define Nash stable networks as in (Bloch and Dutta, 2009 , Definition 2):
Definition 2 (Nash stable networks)
A network Γ(s) is Nash stable if for every individual i and any s i :
The Nash equilibrium may not be the most suitable stability concept for our model. There are at least two reasons for this. We show that starting a contest is profitable for any player, except in the extreme case.
5 Thus, a deviation which leads to the formation of a new link is generically profitable. Second, choosing zero investment in an existing contest will always be strictly dominated, and therefore a deviation which results in a link destruction is never profitable. The former is a consequence of the lack of forward looking when starting a contest. When players are not farsighted, they do not take into account that the opponent will fight back. The latter is a consequence of the fact that Nash stability deals only with unilateral deviations. We discuss these points in more detail in Section 5, where we provide a characterization of Nash stable networks in Proposition 8.
To address the issues pointed out in the previous paragraph, we consider a model in which (i) we assume that when i decides to form a link with j, she takes into account the immediate reaction from j (anticipates that j will fight back), and (ii) we allow for bilateral deviations of players. In the following paragraphs we discuss (i) in more detail.
Models of network formation usually assume either pure myopia or complete farsightedness (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) . As we already mentioned, the perfect myopia in our model leads to the fact that starting a contest is always profitable. Given the complexity of the network effects, full farsightedness is too strong of an assumption to make. Indeed, even for networks with a small number of nodes, solving for the equilibrium requires finding the roots of high order polynomials. Thus calculating all future adjustments in other players' strategies after a deviation is computationally extremely demanding. Moreover, experimental results suggest that limited farsightedness may be the most accurate way to describe players' behavior in network formation games (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) . In this paper we adopt a specific form of limited farsightedness, described in the next paragraph.
Let M ⊂ N be set of players such that g ij / ∈ g(s), ∀j ∈ M . Consider a situation in which i contemplates initiating contests with players j ∈ M (potentially more than one). We assume that when assessing the payoff of starting contest g ij with action s ij player i expects that j will fight back by choosing the best response s ji = BR(s ji ), given j s current total spending s j . This means that when i forms links to players from set M ⊂ N by deviating to s i , her expected payoff is π i (s i ,ŝ −i ) wherê
where we useŝ M i to denote the vector of best responses of j ∈ M to s ij , j ∈ M , keeping s jk , j ∈ M, k ∈ N \ {i} fixed. In Section 5 we argue that this assumption is consistent with recent findings in experiments on contest games (Masiliunas et al., 2014) and network formation (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) .
We are now ready to state the stability concept we use in this paper.
Definition 3 (Limited Farsighted Pairwise Stable Networks)
Weighted network Γ = Γ(s * ) is stable if conditions (AE), (U) and (B) hold.
(AE) For any i ∈ N and any strategy
(U) For any player i ∈ N and any strategy s i such that g(s
For any pair of players (i, j), and strategies
We say that the network of interactions g = g(Γ) is stable if Γ is stable.
Part (AE) of Definition 3 simply states that the strategy profile of the contest game on a given network g is a Nash equilibrium. Parts (U) and (B) state that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her linking pattern, and no two players find it profitable to jointly deviate by deleting the link between them, while at the same time potentially adjusting their strategies in other contests or forming new links. In part, the motivation of this equilibrium concept is dynamic. In Appendix B we propose a process of network formation which has a property that settles only in equlibria from Definition 3. In Section 5 we discuss how stability LFPS relates to other stability concepts usually employed in the literature on weighted network formation.
It is clear that in order to start a contest (create a link), an action of one party suffices. This is a natural property, since, for instance, to start a litigation process it is sufficient that one side files a lawsuit. On the other hand, to end contest g ij , both players i and j must choose zero investment. In other words, to make peace, both sides must choose not to fight. Therefore, in our model, the formation of a link is a unilateral action, while a destruction of a link is a bilateral action.
Analysis
In this section we first outline some properties of the contest game on a given network of interactions. Then we show that the unique efficient network is the empty network. This is not surprising, given the negative sum nature of the bilateral contest game. We then turn our attention to the analysis of stable networks. We state and discuss a series of important intermediate results that lead to one of the main results of the paper -a LFPS network must be a complete M -partite graph with partitions of different sizes. We then provide sufficient and necessary conditions for stability when M = 2.
Preliminary Considerations
We begin our analysis by outlining the properties of the payoff function and the nature of strategic interactions. Then we show that, for any given network g, there exists a unique interior strategy profile s such that condition (AE) from Definition 3 holds. Thus, (Franke and Ozturk, 2015 , Proposition 1 and Lemma 1) hold in a more general environment considered in this paper. We proceed by defining the strength of a player in g, and introducing a useful partition of players with respect to their strengths. Finally, we state an important new result which enables us to compare different contests a player is involved in.
It is straightforward to check that the payoff function (1) is increasing and concave in own strategy s i , and decreasing and convex in opponents' strategies s −i . The sign of the first and the sign of the second derivative of the payoff function with respect to r depend on s i and s −i . When a player's probability of winning is greater the probability of losing in all contests, the payoff function will be decreasing and convex in r. Similarly, if the probability of winning is lower than the probability of losing in all of her contests, the payoff function is increasing and concave in r.
6 Best reply curves of the bilateral contest game are nonlinear and non-monotonic. The bilateral contest game is neither a game of strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.
To the best of our knowledge, the only papers that consider such type of bilateral strategic interactions on networks are (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) and (Bourlès et al., 2017) . Neither of these papers studies network formation.
A version of the existence and uniqueness result for the contest game on a given network (Franke and Ozturk, 2015 , Proposition 1 and Lemma 1), holds in a more general environment considered in this paper. We state this result as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
For a given network g the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (AE) is unique. The equilibrium is interior if there exists x ∈ R ≥0 such that π ij (x, 0; r) − c(x) > 0.
In Proposition 1, the condition for the interior equilibrium requires that a contest against a player that invests 0 is profitable for a player who is not involved in any other contest. If this is not the case, then no player wishes to start a contest against player that does not fight back. This is a non-interesting case, and we will assume for the rest of the paper that φ, c and r are such that the condition for interiority is satisfied. This will, for example, be the case whenever r is small enough. In the special case when φ(x) = x and c(x) = x 2 this holds for finite r > 0.
It is important to note that spillovers across a player's contests come from the assumption that she spends the same type of resources in all of her contests (i.e. time, money) and the convexity of the cost function. Since the player's optimal investments in her contests also depend on her opponents' strategies, the model generates very rich local and global network effects. The non-linear nature of these externalities makes it very hard, if not impossible, to solve explicitly for the equilibrium (AE). Interestingly, we show, in Appendix C, that (AE) is a globally asymptotically stable state of a simple dynamic process of strategy updating. In what follows we assume that the weighted network Γ satisfies (AE), and focus on identifying stable network structures. When we talk about equilibrium investment s * we have in mind the investment consistent with (AE).
We now introduce some additional definitions and notations important for our analysis. We start with the definition of strength of a player in Γ.
Definition 4
Let Γ be a contest network satisfying (AE). Player i ∈ N is said to be stronger than
Definition 4 is motivated with the result that for two players i and j, such that g ij ∈ g and s formally in Proposition 10 in Appendix A.
7 This seemingly counter-intuitive result is a direct consequence of the convexity of the cost function -when the total spending s * i is high, the resources are more costly on the margin. A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that the strength of a player is uniquely determined by her global position in network of interactions g.
We now introduce a useful way to partition players in network Γ. Sort (s * i ) i∈N starting from the lowest (s * 1 < s * 2 < ... < s * M ), where M ≤ n is the number of different total equilibrium investment levels. We use S i to denote the class of players that have the i-th lowest total investment level.
Definition 5
Consider network Γ in (AE). Player a ∈ S i is an attacker if all of her contests are with agents from S i = {S j |j > i}. Player a ∈ S i is a hybrid if there exist players b and c such that g ab , g ac ∈ g and s * b > s * a > s * c . Player a ∈ S i is a victim if she has all of her contests with players from S i = {S j |j < i} Example 1 illustrates the notion of the strength and the partition of nodes.
Example 1
Consider network g depicted in Figure 1 . The total equilibrium investment (the strength) is indicated above the node. We assume r = 0 and c(x) = x 2 when calculating equilibrium (AE). There are three classes of nodes. Members of the same class have the same vertex shape. Players 4 and 5 are attackers, player 1 is a victim and players 2 and 3 are hybrids. The network in Figure 1 is not stable, (B) does not hold.
In order to study the network formation, it is important to be able to compare contests. We now state the result which enables us to do that. Before stating the result, we define the added payoff from contest g ij by:
Proposition 2 states an intuitive result. A strong player i engaged in contests with two players spends less, has a less intensive contest and earns a higher added payoff in the contest with the weaker of the opponents.
Efficient and Stable Networks
In this subsection we state and discuss our main results regarding network formation. We first consider a general setting, with general cost and technology functions (c and φ). It is trivial to show that the empty network is the efficient network. We show that a non-empty stable network must be connected, and must belong to the class of complete M -partite networks. Sizes of the partitions must be different, and the strength of a player increases with the size of her partition. The difference in sizes across partitions must be large enough. Then we focus on a specific class of stable networks with M = 2. We provide the sufficient and necessary conditions for the stability of a complete bipartite network.
Efficient Networks
We briefly discuss the efficient network structure. It is easy to show that the unique network structure which maximizes the total utility of the society is the empty network. This is a direct consequence of the transferable nature of the contest game and the fact that the effort is costly. Indeed, the total payoff that society obtains from network Γ(s) can be expressed as:
In Section 4 we discuss the welfare properties of stable networks. We focus on the total rent dissipation, and the average contest intensity as measures of inefficiency. We discuss how these two measures behave when we vary the parameters of the model, and how this depends on the structure of contest network.
Stable Networks
In this section we identify LFPS network architectures. We start with some useful observations, and then through a series of intermediate results arrive at our main result of this section -a description of stable networks. We describe Nash stable networks and strongly pairwise stable networks in Section 5.
If j is weaker than i and g ij ∈ g, the bilateral deviation in which i and j destroy link g ij will always be profitable for j. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 10 in Appendix A. Therefore, we say that i controls the link with j if i is stronger than j. This in particular implies that in a stable network every attacker (see Definition 5) must receive a positive payoff. If this was not true for some attacker i and contest g ij , then a joint deviation in which i and j choose s ij = s ji = 0 (delete the link g ij ) would be profitable for both i and j.
Network Γ is not stable if for some attacker i, and two players j and k such that s * k ≥ s * j we have g ij ∈ g and g ik / ∈ g. Indeed, in this case the joint deviation in which i and j destroy link g ij , and i forms link g ik is profitable for both i and j ( Figure  2) . Therefore, in a stable network, player j who is not linked to attacker i must be stronger than each opponent of i. We state and prove this result formally in Lemma 1. Figure 2: A profitable deviation: 1 and 2 jointly deviate and delete g 12 . Player 1 additionally forms g 13 . r = 0, c(x) = x 2 , and φ(x) = x.
Lemma 1
Let i be an attacker. If g ij ∈ g(Γ), and Γ is stable then
We now argue that a non-empty stable network Γ must be connected. According to Lemma 1, strong players have an incentive to connect with weak players. We show that this incentive is strong enough to lead to a connected network, in which strong players are indirectly connected through weak players. We state this result in Lemma 4 in Appendix A, and illustrate it in Example 2. In the rest of the paper we focus on connected networks.
Example 2
In (a) player 3 (attacker) and player 1 (victim) have an incentive to jointly deviate and delete g 31 , furthermore, player 3 has an incentive to form g 34 . After this deviation (a) becomes (b). In (b), 2 and 1 have an incentive to sever g 12 and form links with player 4. Resulting network in (c) is stable. Strategy profiles, given g, satisfy (AE), where we set r = 0, c(x) = x 2 , and φ(x) = x. Strength of a player is indicated above the node. We now turn our attention to the attackers. First, we argue that all members of the same class of attackers must have the same neighborhood in a stable network. Then we show that there can be only one class of attackers in a stable network, and that members of this class are connected to all other players in the network, except to the members of their own class. In the next two paragraphs we outline the main intuition behind this result.
If attackers i and j from the same class S have different neighborhoods (N i = N j ) it cannot be that N i ⊂ N j nor N j ⊂ N i . If this was true, s * i and s * j would not be the same, hence i and j would not belong to the same class.
8 Moreover, together with
If k is stronger than every neighbor of player j, from Lemma 1 it follows that there is a profitable deviation for attacker i. If k is not stronger than any neighbor of j, since g jk / ∈ g, the same lemma implies that there is a profitable deviation for attacker j. The incentive to start contests with weak players in the network is the main mechanism at work.
To show that there is only one class of attackers, we consider two representative players from two different classes of attackers, i ∈ S and j ∈ S m . We first show that in a stable network it cannot be that N i ⊂ N j . Indeed, if this was the case, then s * j ≥ s * i . Furthermore, if j does have an incentive to break any of her links (so all contest with N j \ N i are profitable for j), i will have an incentive to form links with all players N j \ N i . This is the case because after such a deviation players from N j \ N i will become even weaker, and since i is stronger than j, each of the newly formed links will increase i's expected payoff. We state and prove this result formally in Lemma 6 in Appendix A. If neighborhoods of i and j are not nested, the argument proceeds analogously to the discussion in the previous paragraph.
Lemma 1 implies that all members of the unique class of attackers S 1 are connected to all nodes in a stable network that do not belong to S 1 . To see this, note that class S 2 must be a class of hybrids or victims. In both cases, all members of S 2 must be connected to every member of S 1 . Then, Lemma 1 implies that members of S 1 must be connected to each member of all other classes S k : k > 2.
Lemma 2
There is only one class of attackers (S 1 ) in a stable network. Members of S 1 are connected to all players outside S 1 .
We now turn our attention to classes of hybrids and victims. We find that, in a stable network, all members of the same class of hybrids have the same neighborhood. To show this, we first partition the neighborhood of a hybrid player into two sets: the set of stronger opponents and the set of weaker opponents. To be more precise,
i }, and refer to these sets as the strong neighborhood of i and the weak neighborhood of i respectively. Consider now the strongest class of hybrids, S 2 . As we have seen before, all members of S 2 must be connected to every member of S 1 . This means that all members of S 2 have the same strong neighborhood. To show they also have the same weak neighborhood, we can use the same argument we have used when arguing that attackers have the same neighborhood. Proceeding inductively, we can show that the claim holds for members of all other hybrid classes S k : 2 ≤ k ≤ K. We formalize this intuition in Lemma 7 in Appendix A.
Since there is a finite number of players, there exists the weakest player (not necessarily one). It is trivial to see that this player cannot win any contest in the equilibrium, and therefore is a victim.
9 From Lemma 1 we know that every player that wins at least one contest must be connected to the weakest player in the network. This means, in particular, that all members of the weakest hybrid class will be connected to the weakest player in the network, and players that are not connected to the weakest player must be the weakest players themselves. The set of weakest players in the network constitutes the class of victims.
So far we have argued that in a stable network we can partition players into M < n classes with respect to their strength. There can be only one class of attackers and only one class of victims. The remaining M − 2 classes, provided that they exist, are classes of hybrids of different strengths. Each player i ∈ S is in a contest with all players outside S . Finally we note that no two different classes in stable network Γ have the same size -where the size of a class is its cardinality. If this was the case for two classes S a and S b , then members of these classes would have isomorphic positions in g, and therefore the same strength. Thus, a contest between i ∈ S a and j ∈ S b would not be profitable for either of players involved. In Lemma 8 in Appendix A we show that members of larger classes are stronger.
We now state the main result about LFPS networks, which is a direct corollary of the results discusses above.
Proposition 3
A stable network is a complete M -partite network. Let |S k | denote the number of nodes that belong to class S k in a stable network. Then
It is clear that |S k | > |S k+1 | is not a sufficient condition for the stability of a complete M -partite network. The difference in strengths, and consequently in the class sizes, must be at least large enough to ensure that every bilateral contest in the network is profitable for the stronger opponent. In a complete M -partite network, no player will have an incentive to create a links, since link g ij such that s * i = s * j = s cannot be profitable.
For the sake of simplicity, we now focus on the particular class of networks from Proposition 3, where M = 2. If not stated otherwise, we assume that φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx 2 , where α > 0. We denote two partitions by A and V , and the sizes of those partitions by a and v respectively. A is the class of attackers, and V is the class of victims. We use K a,v to denote a complete bipartite network with partitions of sizes a and v. We keep the number of players in the population fixed (a + v = n). Due to the symmetry, players that belong to the same partition will play the same strategy in (AE) on K a,v .
Proposition 4
Consider
. There exists v * such that K n−v,v is stable if and only
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 4 it is illustrative to think first about how the equilibrium payoff of an attacker i ∈ A behaves when we move from K a,v to K a−1,v+1 . There are two effects on π * i . First, a higher v means that there are more contests -and therefore the amount of resources that can be appropriated increases, which increases π * i . Second, as v increases, members of V become relatively stronger. Since the number of players in the network n is fixed, an increase in v implies a decrease in a which reinforces this effect, leading to a decrease of π * i . This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 4 . The net effect depends on the size of v in a nonlinear way -for a small v the first effect dominates, while for higher values of v the second effect dominates. Similar reasoning holds when i ∈ A contemplates to end the contest with j ∈ V . Deleting g ij makes i stronger, and therefore will lead to higher payoff from the remaining contests. On the other and, i will be involved in a smaller number of contests, and therefore the maximal amount of resources she can extract will decrease. Note that j always prefers to delete the link with i. To prove Proposition 4 we show that the benefit from deleting a link for members of A is a monotonically increasing function of v which takes negative value for small v but becomes positive as v increases (keeping n constant). 
Comparative Statics
In this section we are primarily interested in inefficiencies associated with stable networks. We focus on two aggregate measures of inefficiency -the rent dissipation: In particular, we analyze how changes in the likelihood of a draw, the marginal cost, and transfer size affect R ands. Not surprisingly, we find that when the effort becomes less expensive on the margin for all players,s and R increase. Similarly, when transfer T increases uniformly for all contests,s and R increase. Interestingly, when the likelihood of a draw r increases, the total spending in the equilibrium as well as the rent dissipation may both decrease and increase. The direction of the effect crucially depends on how asymmetric the stable network is, and on the value of r. The following proposition summarizes these comparative static findings:
Proposition 5 Let φ(x) = x and c(x) = αx 2 . Let K a,v : v < a be a stable network, then:
2.s(K a,v ) and R(K a,v ) increase with transfer T .
3.
•s(K a,v ) increases with r if s * ij − 3s * ji − r is large enough, otherwise it decreases. When r → 0,s(K a,v ) increases with r when a > 37 38 n, and otherwise it decreases.
• R(K a,v ) may both increase and decrease with r. When r → 0, R(K a,v ) it deceases with r.
The non-monotonic effect of a change in r ons and R is a consequence of the non-monotonicity of the best reply function in r. When r is small enough, the best reply function of i ∈ A will be increasing in r as long as BR i (s ji ) > 3s ji + r. For instance, this will be the case when a is large enough. The best reply function of player j ∈ V will always decrease with r. Therefore, a priori it is not clear if an increase in r will result in an increase or a decrease in the equilibrium spending per contest. To illustrate this point, Figure 5 depicts the best response curves for contest g ij ∈ K a,v when r changes from 0 to 0.1. The left panel is the plot for K 4,1 . In this case the increase in r from 0 to 0.1 will lead to the new equilibrium (intersection of dotted lines) in which both i ∈ A and j ∈ V spend less, and therefore the intensity of contest g ij decreases. The situation is different on the right panel, where we consider the effect of the same change but for K 40,1 . In this case, in the new equilibrium i invests more, and the intensity of contest g ij is larger when r = 0.1 than when r = 0. When r becomes arbitrarily large, investment in contests approach to 0. When r increases, keeping the contest efforts fixed, the probability of losing of weak players (members of V ) decrease. Since weak players already have a high marginal cost of spending in the contest, they will have an incentive to decrease their spending. On the other hand, an increase in r will lead to a decrease in the probability of winning for stronger players (members of A). This will, when strong players' investments are not high, lead to an increase in their investments in contests. An increase in the investment of strong players will further increase the incentive of weak players to spend less in contests. What will be the final effect ons depends on the relative magnitudes of the above discussed effects. The effect on the rent dissipation R has an additional dimension. Given the convexity of the cost function, a decrease in spending of weak players will have a larger effect on the total societal cost than the same decrease in spending of members of A. Therefore, in order for rent dissipation to increase with r, an increase in the equilibrium effort of attackers must substantially exceed a decrease in the effort of victims. For instance, we show that this cannot happen when r → 0 in any star network. However when r > 0 and the difference in sizes a − v is large enough this may occur.
In Figure 6 we consider network K 200,1 in which an increase in r can lead to an increase ins and R. Note that the maximal intensitys and R are reached at nonzero values of r. In Proposition 5 we have considered changes that simultaneously affect all players in the network. Now we discuss the effects of a change that affects only one node in the network Γ. We contemplate a scenario in which the cost function of player k for an exogenous reason changes to c k = (α + k )x 2 . We will refer to this change as the cost shock hitting player k. 11 We are interested to see how the equilibrium (AE) strategies, rent dissipation, and the average contest intensity adjust after the shock, and how this depends on the structure of network Γ. We focus on small shocks, k → 0. We first consider stable network K a,v , and then we discuss how this type of shock propagates through arbitrary contest network Γ. To answer this question we note that the total equilibrium spending is implicitly defined with a system of equations (6), where d i denotes the degree of node i in network g (see Lemma 10 in Appendix A)
Taking derivatives of (6) with respect to k and solving for
, i ∈ N we get the following result:
Proposition 6
Let g = K a,v . Suppose player k experiences a cost shock.
11 Other types of shocks can be studied using the same approach.
(ii)
To understand (i) from Proposition 6 not that when k ∈ A the direct effect of the shock hitting k will be that k will decrease its contest investment s * k . Because members of V are weaker than k, their effort in the contest with k will increase. At the same time, they will decrease their investment in contests with other players from A. When k ∈ V , the direct effect of the shock will again cause a decrease in s * k . Since all opponents of k are stronger than k, they will also decrease their investment in contest with k, but will increase their investment in contests with other members of V . This will, in turn, lead to a decrease in the total equilibrium effort of other members of V . This result is a consequence of the network structure of interactions g, and the property of the best reply function, which is increasing in the effort of a weaker opponent and decreasing in the effort of a stronger opponent. Even though some players may spend more in contests after the shock, both R ands decrease after the shock.
We now describe how effects of the shock propagate in an arbitrary network. To state the result it is useful to define matrix Λ with elements Λ ij = ∂π i ∂s i s j
Entry Λ ij captures the nature of the strategic interaction between players i and j in the equilibrium. If Λ ij > 0 then an increase in strength of j leads to an increase in strenght of player j.
12 When Λ ij < 0, the opposite happens. We note that always
. Taking derivatives of (6) with respect to k and solving the resulting system of linear equations, we get the following result.
Proposition 7
The vector of derivatives of strengths with respect to k is given with:
where
Thus the marginal impact of shock k on s * i is equal to a product of the strength of node k and the weighted sum of the number of paths from i to k in the network 12 Recall that an increase in s * i means a decrease in strength of player j.
with adjacency matrix Λ. We note that the expression Proposition 7 highlights the importance of the structure of a contest network for propagation of idiosyncratic shocks. For instance, one can think of change in α as a third party intervention which makes contests more costly for affect player. The effect of this intervention on contest investments of other players in the contest network is described by (7). To estimate the aggregate effects of an intervention, both direct and indirect effects should be taken into account, and Proposition 7 provides a way to do it.
Discussion
In this section we discuss the relation of LFPS and other concepts of stability employed in the analysis of the formation of weighted networks. We point out some issues when these equilibrium concepts are applied to the formation od contest networks, and argue that LFPS addresses these issues. Two stability concepts employed in the small literature of weighted network formation are: the Nash stability (Rogers, 2006, Bloch and Dutta, 2009, ?) , and the strong pairwise stability (Bloch and Dutta, 2009, ?) .
We first discuss Nash stable networks in our model (Definition 2). When parameters of the model are such that a contest can be profitable, the unique stable Nash network will be the complete network in which each player exerts the same, nonnegative, amount of resources in fighting. To see this, suppose that a link between players i and j does not exist. This means that s * ij = 0 and s * ji = 0. If i does not have any connections, then there exists a positive deviation in which i chooses s ij > 0 such that
If i is connected with some player k, then there exists > 0 such that reallocating amount of resources from the contest with k to the new contest with j is a profitable deviation for i. This is a consequence of the concavity of the CSF in (2). Thus, players will always have an incentive to start a contest which makes the complete network the unique Nash stable network architecture. When the expected payoff from any bilateral contest is lower than the cost of any investment level s > 0, the empty network will be Nash stable.
Proposition 8
The Nash stable network is the empty network, when φ(x) ≤ c(x) (r + φ(x)) ∀x > 0. Otherwise the unique Nash stable network Γ(s * ) is the complete network, with s *
TProposition 8 states that the Nash stable network will generically be the complete network. This is true even though no contest in the complete network is profitable for any player, and any two players i and j would prefer to delete link g ij . However, the destruction of a link is never a profitable unilateral deviation. This is a consequence of a coordination problem which often arises in non-cooperative models where link formation is a bilateral decision, such as friendship network formation. To address this issue (Bloch and Dutta, 2009 , Definition 3) introduces the concept of strong pairwise stability, which considers both unilateral and bilateral deviations. We show that a strongly pairwise non-empty contest network does not exist. To see why, recall that the strong pairwise stability is a refinement of the Nash stability. According to Proposition 8 the unique non-empty Nash stable network is the complete network. In the complete network, each pair of players has an incentive to bilaterally deviate by destroying the link between them, since they have the same strength. Therefore, the complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations.
Proposition 9
The strong pairwise stable network will be the empty network if
Otherwise, it does not exist.
When initiating a contest, we may expect that a player takes into account that the opponent will fight back. For instance, this is the case in litigation, lobbying, and conflict. Therefore, in our definition of LFPS networks, we assume that a player takes into account the expected effort a new opponent will devote to this contest. In particular, we assume that, when calculating the expected payoff of starting contest g ij with action s ij , player i expects that j will fight back by choosing the best response s ji = BR(s ji ), given j s current total spending s j . Thus, i is limited farsighted, and does not take into account further adjustments in investments that will take place in the network once g ij is formed. Given the complexity of externalities (calculating all the adjustments in equilibrium strategies when forming a link reduces to solving highly nonlinear system of equations which is even numerically difficult problem), we believe that this a reasonable assumption. Experimental results suggest that in network formation games players are limited farsighted (Kirchsteiger et al., 2016) , even in models that are much simpler than the model considered in this paper. Furthermore, experimental evidence indicate that the difficulty in forming correct beliefs about the opponent's best response may be one of the main reasons behind the fact that in experiments subjects rarely play Nash strategies in Tullock contest games (Masiliunas et al., 2014) .
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge this is the first model of weighted network formation in which the interaction between neighbors is an antagonistic one. Furthermore, in the model, investments of neighbors are neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements, which is a type of interaction that has not been considered in the literature on weighted networks formation so far. In this paper, we characterize efficient and stable networks using different notions of stability. We also derive several comparative statics results illustrating the fact that taking into account the structure of contest network may lead to very different results compared to a case when the network structure is ignored. We believe that the qualitative insights of the model are applicable to many situations including competitions between divisions in companies, lobbying, and allocation of property rights.
There are several promising directions for further research on this topic. First, the model presented in this paper considers only enmity links. It would be interesting to extend the model by allowing formation of weighted friendship links that imply positive spillovers (i.e. reduction of cost of fighting), and see if this leads to different stable network configurations. Introducing heterogeneity is a step which is necessary to make the model predictions empirically testable. Heterogeneity in the effectiveness of the contest technology (function φ), cost of fighting, and transfers can be directly included in the model. Furthermore, one could consider a position in the network as a source of heterogeneity. For instance, we can imagine that the amount of resources each opponent of a country expects to extract decreases with the number of opponents of that country. Finally, we focus on bilateral contests. However many contests (e.g. lobbying) may be multilateral. It would be interesting to study contest network formation when we allow for multilateral contests. A starting point for this may be the model presented in this paper and the recent working paper (Matros and Rietzke, 2018) .
Appendix A: Proofs Definition 6
A n-player game is a concave game if (i) the strategy space (S) is given with S = {S 1 ×S 2 ×...×S n |S i ⊂ E m i ∧m i ∈ N} and E m i is a closed, convex and bounded subset of Euclidian space 13 and (ii) the payoff function π i (s) of every player i is continuous in s = (s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n ) and concave in s i ∈ S i for a fixed s −i ∈ S −i
Lemma 3
The contest game defined in Section 2.1 is a concave game.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) The strategy space S of the game is, in general, unbounded. However, since the transfer is finite (normalized to 1), and the cost function c is strictly increasing and convex, there exists a point x U ∈ R ≥0 such that c(x U ) > 1. No player will wish to exert effort larger than x U in any contest. Therefore we can bound the strategy space from above.
(ii) It is clear that the payoff function π i is continuous and twice differentiable on the domain. To show that the payoff function of player i is concave in s i , we show that the Hessian of i's payoff function with respect to i's strategy is a negative definite matrix. To see this, note that
The inequality in (8) holds as the first term in the difference is negative (due to properties of function φ stated in Section 2.1) and the second term is positive (due to the strict convexity of function c). Furthermore
Thus, the Hessian matrix H i of function π i with respect to s i is the sum of diagonal matrix H i1 with elements on the diagonal equal to:
and matrix H i2 which has all the elements equal to −c (s i ) < 0. H i1 is a negative definite matrix and H i2 is a negative semidefinite matrix, therefore H i = H i1 + H i2 is a negative definite matrix.
13 (Rosen, 1965) actually proves a more general result when the strategy space is coupled, that is when S ⊂ E m = E m1 × E m2 × ... × E mn is a closed, convex and bounded set. Here we consider a special case when the strategy space is uncoupled Proof of Proposition 1.
Existence and Uniqueness. In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium it is enough to follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) .
Interiority. Because of the potentially nonzero likelihood of a draw, this part of the proof is different than the proof of Lemma 1 in (Franke and Ozturk, 2015) . Let there existx > 0 such that
> c(x). Because of the concavity of
− c(x), and the fact that φ (0) r+φ (0) − c(0) = 0 this inequality will hold for every x ∈ (0,x].
We first prove that it cannot be that s * ik = s * ki = 0 when g ik ∈ g. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that s * ik = s * ki = 0 for some g ik ∈ g. If s * i = 0, then investing any s ik ∈ (0,x] is a profitable deviation for i by assumption. If s * i > 0, then there exists some j ∈ N such that g ij ∈ g and s * ij > 0. Consider a deviation in which i reallocates > 0 from g ij to g ik . The total cost of i will remain the same, as will the benefit from all contests g i :
, this deviation is profitable for player i. Indeed, after such a deviation, the loss incurred in g ij will be lower than the benefit from g ik :
where the last inequality holds whenever φ( ) < φ(s * ij ) + φ(s * ji ).
Let us now prove that for two connected players i and j, it cannot be that s * ij = 0 ∧ s * ji = 0. Suppose that, contrary to what is asserted, this is the case for contest g ij . If s * i = 0, we use the same argument as in the first part of the proof. We find that reallocating > 0 from some contest g ik to g ij makes player i better off as long
. When s * i = 0 we find that the deviation from s * ij = 0 to s * ij = s * ji is profitable. Indeed, since j finds it optimal to play s * ji it must be that
Proposition 10
Let Γ satisfy (AE), and assume s *
Proof of Proposition 10. The first-order conditions for contest g ij read:
From (10) we get:
where the last implication in (11) follows from the facts that φ is an increasing function and φ is a decreasing function.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the claim, we compare the solutions of the FOC system associated to links g ab and g ac . Consider first the following parameterized system of equations, with positive parameters β 1 , β 2 :
It is easy to verify that (12) satisfies the conditions of the implicit function theorem. Note that when β 1 = s * a and β 2 = s * b , then x = s * ab and y = s * ba are the solution of system (12). Taking the derivative of x and y defined by (12) with respect to β 1 we get:
For positive x and y, the expression Den will be positive, given the properties of functions φ and c stated in Subsection 2.1. Furthermore, the numerator of ∂x ∂β 1 is negative, while the numerator of ∂y ∂β 1 will be negative when φ(x) < φ(y) (and therefore when x < y since φ is monotonically increasing), and otherwise positive. Therefore, the following holds:
Compare now system (10) associated to g ab and system (10) To prove thatπ a (g ac ) >π a (g ac ) we plug (14) in (5). After some algebra we get:
Corollary 1
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose the claim does not hold. So, suppose s * i ≥ s * j . From Proposition 2 it follows that for every k
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote with s * strategy profile (AE) before the deviation. If g ij is not profitable for i, then it cannot be part of the stable network ((B) does not hold). Suppose that g ij is profitable for i. We show that if there exists k such that s * k ≥ s * j and g ik / ∈ g, there is a jointly profitable deviation for i and j. Since s * j > s * i it is clear that j prefers to destroy link g ij . We show now that it is profitable for i to replace link g ij with g ik . Expressing φ(s * ij ) from (10) we get that in the equilibrium:
Write (14) as:
Consider the following deviation of player i. Player i keeps his effort levels in all other contests fixed, and chooses s ik = s * ij . The following equation definesŝ ki :
It is clear that s *
we can use the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 2 to show that this deviation is profitable by showing thatŝ ki < s * ji .
Lemma 4
A non-empty stable network g is connected.
Proof of Lemma 4: We use a proof by contradiction. Assume that the claim of the lemma does not hold, so there are at least two components in stable network g. Choose two components (C 1 and C 2 ) from g such that the weakest player in the network (v 1 ) belongs to C 1 . All opponents of v 1 must find the contest with v 1 profitable, otherwise the network would not be stable ((B) would not hold). Then, the strongest player in C 2 (denote her with a 2 ) by Lemma 1 has an incentive to form a link with v 1 instead of a link with one of her current opponents, who by definition is not weaker than v 1 . If |C 2 | = 1 then a 2 does not have any opponents. Then, she has an incentive to form a link with v 1 , since g a 1 v 1 ∈ g is a profitable contest for a 1 .
Lemma 5
Two players that belong to the same class of attackers S a have the same neighborhood in stable network Γ.
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider two attackers i, j ∈ S a . First we show that they must have the same degree in Γ. Suppose this is not true, that is, suppose that d j > d i . It cannot be that N i ⊂ N j because then the total spending of i and j would not be equal (Corollary 1). Since N i = N j , there must exist nodes h ∈ N i \N j and k ∈ N j \N i . Suppose that, without loss of generality, s * k ≥ s * h . Then it is profitable for player i to replace g ih with link g ik according to Lemma 1. This is in contradiction with the assumption that Γ is stable. So it must be d a = d b .
Let us now prove that also N i = N j . Again, assume this is not the case. Then we can find two nodes h ∈ N i \N j and k ∈ N j \N i such that, without loss of generality, s * k ≥ s * h . But then it would be better for player i to replace link g ih with link g ik according to Lemma 1. The assumption that N i = N j led us to the contradiction and must be rejected.
Lemma 6
Let i and j be two attackers. It cannot be that N i ⊂ N j in a stable network.
Proof of Lemma 6. If i and j belong to the same class, then Lemma 5 implies N i = N j . Consider now the case when i and j belong to different classes of attackers. We show that the claim of the Lemma holds using proof by contradiction. Consider Γ which satisfies (AE). We assume that N i ⊂ N j and show that there will always exist a profitable deviation.
. We show that in this case i can form links to all players in N j \ N i , and obtain a payoff greater than π j (s * ). To show this, consider the deviation in which player i deviates tos i = s * j . Let us denote the payoff of player i after this deviation with π i (s i ,ŝ −i ) whereŝ −i is defined in (4). We proceed by showing that
Because s * i < s * j , Proposition 2 implies that s * ki < s * kj k ∈ N i . The convexity of the cost function implies thatŝ ki < s * kj for all k ∈ N j \ N i under the contemplated deviation. This means that after the deviation the expected cost of i will be equal to the cost of j, i and j will have the same set of opponents, and
Suppose now that π i (s * ) > π j (s * ), and suppose that j does not have an incentive to update her strategy (otherwise the network would not be stable). From π i (s * ) > π j (s * ) it follows that:
Consider now the same deviation of player i, as contemplated in the first part of the proof. Denote M = N j \ N i . We get:
where the first inequality comes directly from (16) and the last inequality comes from the fact thatŝ ki < s
Proof of Lemma 2:
We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose there are two different classes of attackers S 1 and S 2 . Since Lemma 5 implies that all members of the same class of attackers have the same neighborhood, we restrict our attention to representative nodes i ∈ S 1 and j ∈ S 2 . Assume without loss of generality that s * j > s * i .
We first prove that it must be π * i = π * j . Assume this is not the case. Since s * j > s * i there are two possible situations that we need to consider.
h Lemma 1 implies that j has a profitable deviation. If s * k < s * h the same Lemma implies that i has a profitable deviation. Hence, in a stable network it must be π * i = π * j .
We now prove that in a stable network it must be that N i = N j . Since s * j > s * i , it must be that d j > d i or the distributions of total spending of i s and j s opponents are different. We show that in both cases there exists a feasible deviation which makes one of the players better off. 
Let us first consider the case when
, then it is profitable for i to replace g iq with g i where ∈ N j \N i . If g jq exists, then the profitable deviation is to replace g jq with g jh where h ∈ N i \N j .
Lemma 7
In a stable network Γ, all members of a hybrid class are connected to all other nodes in the network that do not belong to their class.
Proof of Lemma 7:
If there are only two classes of nodes in a stable network (S 1 and S 2 ) then there are no hybrid types. Suppose there are more than two classes of nodes in a stable network. First, let us consider the strongest mixed type class (S 2 ). A node h ∈ S 2 must be connected to all nodes from S 1 . This is because hybrid h must be connected to at least one player that is stronger than her, who must be an attacker since h ∈ S 2 . Then, Lemma 2 implies that h must be connected to all players from S 1 .
Let us now prove that all members of the class S 2 have the same neighborhood. Suppose this is not true. Let h 1 and h 2 be two players from S 2 such that N h 1 = N h 2 . Let S 3 be the third strongest class in the network. If K = 3 then, by definition, all players in S 2 must be connected to some players from S 3 , because otherwise they would not be hybrid types. Note that if player i ∈ S 3 is connected to some player from class S 2 then she is connected to all players from class S 2 -because we have shown that all members of class S 2 have the same neighborhood. If there exists player j ∈ S 3 who is not connected to all players from S 2 , then j is only connected to all players from S 1 . But then i and j cannot belong to the same class. So, for K = 3 the claim of the lemma holds.
The following implication holds: (S
Suppose K > 3. Lemma 1 implies that all members of S 1 must be connected to all members of S 3 since they are connected to all members of S 2 .
We now show that all players from S 2 are connected to all players from S 3 . Again we proceed by using a proof by contradiction. Suppose that there exist players i ∈ S 2 and j ∈ S 3 such that g ij / ∈ g. We show that in this case there is a profitable deviation. Since all players from S 2 have the same neighborhood there are no links between members of class S 2 and j. This means that j loses only in contests with players from S 1 . Hence, j has control over all of her links except links with players from S 1 . Furthermore, s *
implies that j has a profitable deviation, and if s * k < s * h , the same Lemma implies that i has a profitable deviation.
If π * i = π * j it must be that d j > d i or that the distributions of total spending of i s and j s opponents are different. We show that in both cases there exists a profitable deviation.
If link g iq ∈ g then it is profitable for i to replace g iq with g im : m ∈ N j \N i . If g jq ∈ g, then j has an anologous profitable deviation.
We have shown that in a stable network it cannot happen that there are no links between members of S 2 and S 3 . If two players from S 2 and S 3 are connected, than all players from S 2 and S 3 are connected, because all players from S 2 have the same neighborhood and because of Lemma 1.
Using the same reasoning as above, we can show that all players from S k must be connected to all players from S k+1 . Since the number of nodes in the network is finite, the number of classes is finite and this procedure reaches S K in a finite number of steps.
Corollary 2
There is only one class of victims in a stable network Γ and all victims have the same neighborhood Proof of Corollary 2: Follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 8
Let |S k | denote the number of nodes that belong to class
Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose that the claim does not hold, so |S k | < |S k+1 | for some k = 1, , , , , M . The system (10) implies that s * ij = s * ih ∀{i, j, h} ∈ N ∧ {j, h} ∈ S l , l ∈ {1, 2, ..., M }. So, in a stable network, for any two players a, b such that a ∈ S k and b ∈ S k+1 , we have that s * a = i =k |S i |s * ai and s *
. This is in contradiction with a ∈ S k and b ∈ S k+1 .
Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 2, Lemma 7 and Corollary 2 it directly follows that a nonempty stable network Γ must be a complete M -partite network. Lemma 8 directly implies assymetry in sizes.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Fix the number of nodes in the network n. Define func-
where s * v,n−v denotes the equilibrium per-contest investments of a member of V . Note that f (n, v, s * v,n−v , r) is the expected benefit of destroying a link of an attacker in g = K n−v,v .
We will show that function f is monotonic in v ∈ [1, a] and that it takes a negative value when v is small, and a positive value when v is big. We first show the monotonicity, that is we show that for v ∈ [1, a] f (n, v − 1, r) < f (n, v, r) .
In order to do this, first we show that h decreases with s, and that it decreases faster with s for higher values of v ( ∂h ∂s decreases with v). Indeed, taking the derivative of h with respect to s we get:
Where we used the fact that ∂h ∂x = 0, since x is the maximizer of h. Differentiating with respect to v we get:
The above derivative will be negative for all positive values of s and x such that x ≥ s and ∂x ∂v < 0. This will hold in particular when v ∈ [1, a] -since in K n−v,v , attackers exert a higher effort than victims (x ≥ s) and the best response function of members A decreases with v ( ∂x ∂v < 0). From (19) and (20) we have that when v ∈ [1, a)
Since s * v−1,n−v+1 < s * v−1,n−v < s * v,n−v from (21) directly follows that:
Finally, using the fact that h is concave in v (directly follows from the concavity of payoff function and therefore:
Thus, f (n, v, r) is strictly increasing in v.
If, for a given n, there exists a nonempty stable network, the star network must be stable. This means that when v = 1, f takes a negative value as in a stable star network no player wishes to delete a link. We also know that when v = a no player earns positive payoff from any contest, so f takes a positive value. The fact that f is strictly monotone, and that it changes sign implies that there exists v * ∈ [1, a] such that f (n, v, r) ≥ 0 for v ≥ v * and f (n, v, r) ≤ 0 for v ≤ v * , which completes the proof.
Lemma 9
The contest game on a complete bipartite network K v,a can be represented as a nice aggregative game as defined in Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) .
Proof of Lemma 9:
The contest game on a complete bipartite network K a,v , with φ(x) = x is strategically equivalent to a simultaneous move bilateral contest game of perfect information between players i and j, in which the strategy space of each player is the set of nonnegative real numbers and the payoffs are defined by:
Indeed, it is easy to check that the set of FOC which determines the Nash equilibrium of the above defined game is equivalent to the set of FOC that determine (AE) on K a,v .
Since
it is straightforward to verify that this game is a nice aggregative game studied in (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013) .
Proof of Proposition 5.
1. Since the number of links is fixed,s is proportional to the total contest effort.
Due to the symmetry, each contest on K a,v is of the same intensity. According to Lemma 9, the contest game on a complete bipartite network can be represented as a nice aggregative game. To prove thats(K a,v ) decreases with α, it is sufficient to show that a decrease α is a positive shock (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013, Definition 9) . A decrease in α will lead to a new cost functionc :c (x) < c(c) ∀x ∈ R ≥0 andc. Denote withπ i the payoff function of player i ∈ A (and symmetrically for j ∈ V ) after this change. Then it is straightforward to see that
whenc (vs ij ) ≤ c (vs ij ). Therefore a descrease in α is a positive shock.
To show that R(K a,v ) decreases with α we rely on the implicit function theorem. We are interested in the sign of:
where we have used the fact that for K a,v we have
To calculate partial derivatives in (22) we recall that the first order conditions for the interior equilibrium of the contest game on K a,v are given by: 3. To conduct a comparative static exercise with respect to r we cannot apply the result for aggregative games, as an increase in r can be a positive shock for one player, and at the same time a negative shock for some other player. Indeed,
does not have the same sign for all non-negative arguments. Therefore, we rely on the implicit function theorem. Taking the derivative of (23) with respect to r we get the following system of equations:
Using the symmetry, and solving for s * ij (r) and s * ji (r) we get: (24) is always negative. On the other hand, s * ij can take also positive values, which happens whenever:
We now discuss the sign of ∂s * ∂r .
From (24) we get
When c(x) = αx 2 , equation (25) simplifies to
The above inequality will hold when a(r + 3s * ji − s * ij ) is sufficiently small and negative. This will happen when a is large enough, and r is small enough.
In a specific case when r → 0 (25) becomes:
, so the above inequality can be written as:
From (24) 
which is true whenever a ≥ 37v.
4. To evaluate the effect of change in r on R we note that ∂R ∂r = 2αav vs * ij ∂s * ij ∂r + as * ji ∂s * ji ∂r .
Using (23) we get:
Therefore,
R ∂r
> 0 whenever
In the special case when r → 0 (27) simplifies to
The necessary condition for (28) to hold is s * ij > However, when r > 0, we numerically find that the rent dissipation may increase in r. This will, for example, be the case in a star network K 200,1 when r = 0.1. In that case, we get s * ij ≈ 0.32, s * ji = 0.01 and the left hand side of (27) takes value 3.81.
Lemma 10
The total spending of each node in the equilibrium is defined as a solution of system (6). 
Summing over all contests of player i, and setting α i = α i = k and α k = α + k we get (6).
Plugging in (30) into (1) we get (29).
Proof of Proposition 6. Due to the symmetry, (6) becomes: 
Differentiating with respect to k , and letting k → 0 we get the following linear system: 
Plugging (34) in (33) and solving the resulting linear system we get
Finally from (35) and (34) < 0, and
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote with k the node that is experiencing the shock.
Differentiating (6) ≤ c(x) ∀x ∈ R ≥0 it is clear that no player wish to invest in a contest, since the benefit from a contest is always smaller or equal than the cost. Here we assume that if the benefit from a contest is equal to the cost of the contest, a player prefers not to fight.
We now show that if the condition from the statement of the proposition is not satisfied, a player will always wish to start a contest. Suppose that − c(x), this inequality will hold for every x ∈ (0,x]. We first show that it cannot be s * ik = s * ki = 0 for any two players in the Nash stable network. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that s * ik = s * ki = 0 for two players i and k. We distinguish two cases.
• (i) If s * i = 0 then investing s ik ∈ (0, x] is a profitable deviation for i by assumption.
• (ii) If s * i > 0 then there exists some j ∈ N such that s * ij > 0. Consider a deviation in which i reallocates > 0 from g ij to start contest g ik . The total cost of i will remain the same, as will the benefit from all contests g i : / ∈ {j, k}. If > 0 is such that φ( ) < φ(s * ij ) + φ(s * ji ), this deviation is profitable for player i. Indeed, after such a deviation, the loss incurred in g ij will be lower than the benefit from g ik :
We have proved that a Nash stable network must be the complete network. From Proposition 1 it follows that each player will invest nonzero effort in all of her contests. Since in the complete network each player has the same position in the network, the equilibrium strategies will be the same across players.
Proof of Proposition 9. It is clear that when the empty network is Nash stable, then it is immune to bilateral deviations.
Consider the case when the Nash stable network is the complete network. Since in the complete network all players play the same strategy, a player's expected benefit from a contest is 0, while the cost is strictly greater than 0. Therefore, for any two players it is strictly profitable to end the contest between them.
Online Appendix B LPFS as a resting point of a dynamic process of network formation We can think of the stable networks from Definition 3 as stable states of a coupled dynamic process we present in this subsection. Players make decisions about their links and about actions assigned to those links. We assume that a link between players i and j is formed if one player decides to form it (unilateral), while link g ij is destroyed if both agents agree to destroy it (bilateral). Time is indexed with t ∈ N ∪ {0}. In t = 0 an arbitrary contest network Γ(s) is given.
For each period t:
(i) At the beginning of period t the network from t − 1 is in (AE).
(ii) Players i and j are chosen randomly from the population. They jointly choose their linking patterns which leads to a network of interactions g t+1 . Players calculate the expected benefit from forming a link as described in Subsection 2.2.
(iii) The second dynamic process (action adjustment process 14 ) starts, and all agents update their actions in contests on network g t+1 according to the action adjustment process formally described below, reaching (AE) on g t+1 .
We now formally describe the action adjustment process mentioned in (iii) above. Let ∇ i π i denote the gradient of the payoff function with respect to s i . Define function J : i R n ≥0 → i R n ≥0 with:
The action adjustment process is defined with:
where λ is a constant. It is clear that (AE) is the stable state of this process. We also prove that (AE) is a globally assymptotically stable state of (39). To show this, we show that the rate of change of ||J|| = JJ is always negative (and equal to 0 in the equilibrium). Denote with G the Jacobian matrix of J. The following holds: JJ = (Gṡ) J + J Gṡ = (J G J + J GJ) = J (G + G)J < 0, where the last inequality follows from the fact that (G + G) is a negative definite matrix, and G is the transposed matrix G. Thus, if every player adjusts her actions according to the adjustment process in (39), the action adjustment process converges, irrespective of the initial conditions. Thus, we have proved Proposition 11.
Proposition 11
The action adjustment process given by equation (39) is globally asymptotically stable.
We do not study the properties of the dynamical process of network formation. However, it is clear from the definition that if this process settles on a single network configuration. then this network must be LPFS. It is interesting to note that Proposition 11 has a very practical application. It provides an efficient way to numerically calculate the action equilibrium on an arbitrary network.
